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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ARXOLD SIEYERTS, JOHN
SIEYERTS, ALBERT SIEVERTS,
J~\~IES SIEYERTS and ABRAHAM
SIEYERTS, JR., a co-partnership doing business as IXLAND DEVELOP~IBXT CO~IP 4-\.KY,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Case No. 7889

-vs.DOXALD ~L WHITE and LAVINE
H. \\~HITE, husband and wife,

Defendants and Respondents.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS AND RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
It is believed that a brief resume of the facts might
be helpful to the proper presentation of the respondents'
argument. Appellants have a rather lengthy statement of
facts which includes copious quotations from the pleadings and a good deal of argument. It is more in the nature of an argument than a narrative statement of what
the evidence and testimony showed.
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On or about June· 7, 1950, the appellants and the
respondents entered into a uniform real estate contract
for the sale of certain real property described in it. The
purchase price was $18,000.00, $7,000.00 of which was
to be paid upon execution of the contract. This amount
was paid. By December 15, 1950, $15,000.00 was to have
been paid, including the $7,000.00 down payment. Theremaining $3,000.00 was to have been paid on or before
June 7, 1951. The plaintiffs did not make payments in
accordance with the contract. In January of 1951 a conversation was had between the respondents and Abraham
Sieverts, one of the appellants, respecting the money
which should have been paid on the contract by December
15, 1950. (R. 106) As a result of this conversation $2,000.00 was paid to the respondents. Payments of $1,000.00
were made thereafter in the months of February, March,
April and May, 1951, by the appellants. Appellants claim
an oral1nodification as a result of this discussion, which
is denied by the respondents. (R. 106)
No payment was made by the appellants after Ma~·
of 1951. By a letter dated July 19, 1951 (R. 8) the appellants were notified by the respondents that they were
delinquent, and that unless the remaining balance on the
contract together with the interest were paid within 20
days of the date of the letter the contract would be cancelled.
The respondents heard nothing from appellants until
August 7, 1951, about the letter of July 19th. On that
date a telephone conversation was had between McKay
Loveland, a real estate dealer and the agent of the ap2
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pellants, and i\Irs. 'Yhite, one of the respondents, respecting the demand for payment previously referred to.
Mrs. White told Loveland and Abraham Sieverts, who
was listening to the conversation on another extension,
that she did not want a check, but wanted cash, and that
upon receipt of the Inoney she would execute a deed to
the property. (R. 58)
~\.ppellants did not on August 7, 1951 deliver to the
respondents cash, a cashier's check or a check of any kind,
nor did they offer to do so. After five o'clock on August
7, 1951, the appellants, with the help of Loveland, devised
a letter which was sent by registered mail to the respondents, stating that a check of the Inland Development Company for the balance of the purchase price was prepared
and available for respondents. The check was not sent
with the letter, which was delivered on August 8, 1951.
Delivery of the letter was refused by respondents.
Thereafter, on August 13, 1951, a notice of cancellation of the contract (Exhibit C, R. 9) was served upon appellants by the sheriff of Salt Lake County, by delivering
it to James Sieverts, one of appellants.
Thereafter appellants instituted suit for specific
performance of the contract, and respondents answe·red
and counterclaimed for cancellation of the contract and
for forfeiture.
ARGUMENT
POINT NO 1.
THE TRIAL COURT MADE SUFFICIENT FINDINGS
AND DID NOT FAIL TO MAKE FINDINGS ON ANY RELEVANT OR DETERMINATIVE ISSUE.

In the argument upon Point No. 1 relied ·on by the
3
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appellants, the statement is made that a party is entitled
to have the court make findings of fact on relevant and
material issues with respect to his theory of the case.
In argument upon this point, five separate failures
of the court to make findings are set forth. With respect
to the obligation of a trial court to make findings, a
general statement of the law might be helpful.
A fair statement of the law is to be found in American Juris prudence, Vol. 53, paragraph 1143, under the
heading of trials. The· following is quoted from that paragraph:
"It has been said that if the findings of fact
made by the trial court leave some issue or material fact undetermined, such issue or fact will be
regarded as not proved by the party having the
burden of proof. Accordingly, where a special
finding is silent as to a fact the existence of which
is necessary to make out the plaintiff's case, the
presumption is that the fact did not exist. Again,
where there is a decision against the party and a
failure to find on a counterclaim interposed by
him, this has been held to amount to an implied
finding against such counterclaim. On the other
hand, a refusal to find a fact requested is not equivalent to an affirmative finding to the contrary.
If it were, a judgment might be based upon a decision made up wholly of refusals.
"Where there is no express finding as to a
fact but there· is a finding as to another fact which
necessarily determines the existence of the former,
this is sufficient as an implied finding. Accordingly, where findings made necessarily negative
the allegation of a party concerning certain
matters, the failure of the court to find expressly
and specifically on such matters is not error.
4
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..

...

.. A8 has been noted, a general finding imports
a finding of eyery subsidiary fact necessary to
that re8ult."

The law appears to be that if the court does not make
findings upon eYery specific facet of the theory of a party
to a law suit, that these are denied by implication, which
is the case with respect to those failures complained of
by the appellants.
This court has supported the general propositioH
of law hereinabove set forth in various decisions.
Statements of the necessity for the trial court to
find specifically on every issue presented by the pleadings of both sides, and whether failure to do so is error
is commented on in Skliris v. Melis, 170 P. 968. The
question involved in that case was whether there had
been a valid legitimate assignment of a judgment from
Nick l\Ielis to his brother, Gust Melis. It was contended
by the appellants in that case that the assignment was
sham and fraud and was not made for good consideration.
The trial court found a valid assignment, and conversely
did not find specifically with respect to the contention of
fraud, 'Sham and deceit. The trial court's failure to make
a specific finding with respect to that matter was assigned
as error. This court held that it was not error, and Mr.
Justice :McCarty in the opinion, at page 969 of 170 P.,
has the following to say:
"\Yhere, as in the case at bar, the court makes
affirmative findings of fact on the material issues,
in favor of one of the parties to an action or proceeding-, which findings are inconsistent with and
5
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are necessarily a complete negative of the truth
of the matte·r set forth in the pleadings of the
other party, the failure of the court, to expressly
and specifically find on the n1atters the truth of
which is thus negatived is not error. Snelgrove
v. Earl, 17 Utah 321, 53 Pac. 1017; Bowers v. Cottrell, 15 Idaho 221, 96 Pac. 936; Henderson v.
Reynolds, 57 Or. 186, 110 Pac. 979; Fox v. Haarstick, 156 U.S. 67 4, 15 Sup. Ct. 457; 39 L. Ed. 576;
38 Cyc. 1953, 1964."
A similar problem was raised in the case of Sidney
Stevens Implement Co. v. Hintze, 67 P. (2d) 632. In that
case the defendant had the plaintiff build a special trailer
according to certain specifications. The plaintiff, builder
of the trailer, failed to follow the specifications and the
trailer was unusable by the defendant. The plaintiff
sued for the purchase price of the trailer. A question
arose as to whether the defendant had waived his right
to insist upon the original specifications. This position
was taken by the plaintiffs in their pleadings. The trial
court failed to make a specific finding on this matter,
held for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed. Among
the errors assigned was the failure of the trial court
to make a specific finding on the matter of the waiver.
This court, in an opinion by Judge Hanson, held that
failure to make such a finding was not error. At page 638
of 67 P. ('2d) the court had the following to say: .
"The findings of the court reflect the substance of the evidence outlined by us, and, in our
opinion, are sufficiently supported by the evidence
and are sufficient to suprport the judgment of the
court. The plaintiff's assignments of error relating to the sufficiency of the evidence, therefore,
6
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are oYerruled. \Ye are also of the opinion that the
findings of the trial court reflecting the evidence
ahoYe referred to necessarily negative the allegations of plaintiff's reply that defendant waived
the stipulation as to weight and is estopped to rely
thereon. In such case 'the failure of the court to
expressly and specifically find on' such matters
is not error. Skliris Y. ~felis, 51 Utah 391, 170 P.
968."
The plain i1nplica tion of the general statement of
law and these rases is that if the trial court doe·sn't believe the contentions which appear in the pleadings of one
party or the other, he may make findings in accord with
the theory and contentions of the other party. The failure to make a specific finding with respect to every contention of the losing party is not error.
The appellants refer to five specific things upon
which they contend the trial court should have made findings. As indicated above, the respondents contend that
no findings specifically showing these issues were necessary, but respondents believe a brief comment upon these
five subsections under Point No. 1 in appellants' brief
might be helpful.
The first failure complained of is that the trial court
didn't make a finding "as to whether there was a modification, oral or by operation of law, of the original contract."
The finding made by the trial court that the original
contract was entered into, that the appellants did not
abide hy it, and the decree cancelling the contract indicate
clearly that the court found no oral modification or modi7
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fication by operation of law.
Any modification at all was denied by the respondent, Lavine White. The only important evidence offered
by the appellants with respect to a modification is in the
testimony of Abraham Sieverts. (R. 106) The following question and answer appear in the transcript:

"Q. All right. Now, what was discussed on
that time~ Will you tell us what the Whites said
and what you said in reference to this contract?
"A. Said part of the con tract there had to be
paid up, of which we or I told them that we would
have to make different negotiations; and they
mentioned the fact that they couldn't do it or
didn't want to do it, and it was just a matter of
discussion on that same thing I just mentioned,
and so we did come to an agreement of giving
them-to give her two thousand dollars and then
give her a thousand dollars a month, of which she
was more or less agreed; and as they left the
office, I told Don and Lavine White if they were
not, then do not cash the check and we will have to
make other arrangements."
It is abundantly clear from the colloquy between
counsel and one of the appellants that there was no oral
modification. Even the statement of Abraham Sieverts
indicates that other arrangements would have to be
made and not that a modified con tract was then entered
into. Certainly this amounts to no more than a unilateral
attempt by Sieverts to effect a modification.
Appellants contend that the court failed to make a
finding respecting whether the defendants and respondents tendered a deed and whether such tender was made
8
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in such manner as to place plaintiffs in ctefault.
It is the contention of the respondents that a deed
was tendered and that they had the ability to execute a ·
good and sufficient warranty deed in accordance with the
contract. Respondents further contend that their tender
of a deed was entirely sufficient to place the plaintiffs
in default.
The reasons for these contentions on the part of the
respondents are more fully and completely set forth in the
argument on Point X o. 3 herein.
Appellants complain that the trial court failed to
make a finding as to whether the defendants and respond~
ents objected to the form or sufficiency of the tender
of the balance of the purchase price.
As previously noted, the findings of the trial court
are sufficient and it was not necessary that a specific
finding with respect to that matter be made.
The record, however, is replete with refusals on the
part of the respondent, Lavine White, to accept a check
in payment of the balance of the purchase price. In the
testimony of McKay Loveland (R. 58) there appears the
statement that Mrs. White would be willing to sign a deed
if she got the money. It should be noted that Loveland
was an important witness for the appellants. At another
place in his testimony Loveland is recalling a conversation between Abraham Sieverts and Lavine White (R. 58)
during which Abraham Sieverts said "Will you take a
check" and her answer was "No, I want cash."
It is worthy of notice that in the testimony of Abraham Sieverts one of the appellants, there is another

'

9
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reference to a co~versation between Abraham Sieverts
and Lavine White. (R. 108) The following question was
asked Abraham Sieverts by Mr. Burton:
"What was said as to the manner in which you
were to pay her in the conversation that day?"
Abraham Sieverts made the following answer:
"She did say that-she says-I says, we will
have a check here for you. She says, I don't wan!:
your check."
The record contains a great many other references
to the objection to taking a check and refusal to take a
check by the respondents. No useful purpose would be
served here by multiplying examples of the objections.
Appellants further complain that no finding was
made as to whether the defendants wilfully avoided payment by the plaintiffs of the unpaid balance of the purchase price. There is absolutely no basis for the court
to have made such a finding and there is no evidence in
the record that the defendants wilfully avoided receiving
the purchase price.
On the contrary, the record clearly shows that the
purchase price in a form acceptable to the defendants was
never offered to them. It is not contradicted that on the
8th day of August, 1951, there was delivered to the residence of the Whites a registered letter, delivery of whirh
was refused. It is also uncontradicted that the letter contained nothing but a notice that a check of Inland Development Company in the amount of the balance of the
purchase pri'ce was available. It has already been made
clear that this mode of payment had been specifically
10
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and vigorously rejected by the defendants, and particularly Lavine White. There is nothing in the record to
show that at any time on August 8, 1951, or thereafter
until depo'Sitions of the defendants were taken that an
offer of cash or a certified check was ever made. It
therefore becomes clear that payment was not wilfully
avoided by the defendants, because payment in proper
form was never timely offered to them.
The appellants complain that no finding was made
as to whether title to the property was sufficient or as to
whether defendants were ready, willing or able to submit
evidence of title.
Appellants in their brief set forth in full Finding
No.16 (R. 238), which reads as follows:
·'That at the execution of the contract on
June 7, 1950 the buyers exercised their option to
receive such evidence of title and that an abstract
covering approximately 10 acres of· the property
described in said contract was furnished to the
agent of the plaintiffs, one McKay Loveland, and
. continued for plaintiffs at the request of their
agent, the said McKay Loveland, and that a re-quest for a policy of title insurance on the remaining land covered by the contract was made by the
said .JicKay Loveland, as agent of the plaintiffs,
and that the said 1IcKay Loveland charged the
defendants in the closing statement that was submitted to the defendants at the time of the execution of the contract for the continuation of the
abstract and the title insurance and that the said
MciCay Loveland was paid for both the continuation of the abstract and the necessary title insurnnce by the defendants at the time of the execution or' the contract."
11
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This seems perfectly clear that the court found from
the evidence that at the time of entering into the contract
the plaintiffs exercised their option to have evidence of
title submitted to them. It should be noted in this connection that McKay Loveland was the agent for the plaintiffs. (R. 77) During cross-examination of Loveland he
was asked "You began by being the agent for the
Sieverts f' He answered "That's correct." In the testimony of Abraham Sieverts there is a statement that
Loveland was their agent. (R. 113, 114)
The record shows that at the time the contract was
entered into Loveland, as agent of the appellants, had the
abstract of title (Exhibit G) which covered the major
portion of the property involved. It appears from the
record (R. 80) that the abstract was brought up to date
by Loveland, the appellants' agent.
The record shows that a preliminary report for a
policy of title insurance covering the remainder of the
property described in the contract and not cove·red by
the abstract (Exhibit G) was ordered and was available
to Loveland and to the Sieverts. It appears further that
Loveland. charged the defendants and respondents the
sum of $38.50 for the policy of title insurance and that
he was paid the money. (R. 81) It further appears that
Loveland charged the defendants for bringing the abstract up to date, and that he was paid the sum of $24.25
for that. (R. 81)
It further appears that at the time the contract was
signed the abstract was available to both Loveland and
Abraham Sieverts, and that they then had an opportunity

12
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to exmnine it. ( R. 83)
In the light of the testimony by Abraham Sieverts
and LoYeland, both witnesses for the appellants, hereinabove referred to, there was ample evidence from which
the trial court could find, as it did, that the appellants
exercised their option to be presented with evidence of
title at the time the contract was signed.
POINT NO.2.
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO MAKE A GOOD AND SUFFICIENT TENDER IN GOOD FAITH OF THE PURCHASE
PRICE BY CHECK OR OTHERWISE.

Appellants in their brief argued in Point No. 2 that
where no objection is raised to a tender by check, such a
tender is sufficient.
It is undisputed that the appellants were notified
by respondents that they were in default on their contract and that unless the balance of the purchase price
was paid within twenty days from the date of the notice,
the con tract would be cancelled.
As previously stated in the argument of Point No.
1 in this brief, the record contains many references to
the objection of the respondents to payment by check.
(R. 72, 73, 58 and 107) No necessary or useful purpose
would be served by repeating verbatim these statements
which appear in the transcript.
In their argument of Point No.2, the appellants refer
to the case of Hirsh v. Ogden Furniture & Carpet Co.,
48 Utah 434, 160 P. 283. This is the only Utah case cited
in support of that point.
We desire to call the court's attention to the Hirsh

13
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case for the purpose of showing that the present Utah
statute, 104-54-10, is the same with respect to the objec.:
tion to a tender as the statute that was in force in 1916
when the Hirsh case was decided.
Respondents have no quarrel with the doctrine announced by that case or the statutory provision. It simply
does not apply to the case at bar for the reason, as ·we
have obse,rved many times, that abundant and continuous objections were made by the respondents to payment
by check.
Appellants cite numerous cases in support of their
position and refer to a statement with respect to the tender of checks found in 62 C.J. 668. Respondents do not
disagree with the proposition supported by these cases
and text references, but again state that they do not apply
to this case.
In argument on this point appellants cite the case
of Neal v. Finley, 136 Ky. 346, 124 S..W. 348. A quotation
from that case appears in appellants' brief and we feel
it is worthwhile repeating:
"It is true that ordinarily a tender of payment
in any way than by legal-tender money is not good.
But the parties Inay waive that feature of the law.
If tender is made in bank bills, or check, the tender
will. be deemed sufficient (provided, in case of
check, the drawer has sufficient funds in the bank
to meet the payment), unless the refusal is based
upon the ground that the tender is not in lawful
money."
We wish specifically to call the court's attention to
the statement by the Kentucky court that tender by check,
if not objected to, will be deemed sufficient provided, in

14
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the case of check, the drawer has s~tff·icient funds in the
ba.nk to meet the payment.
It is necessary· in this connection to call the court's
attention to the fact that the check of Inland Development
Company which appellants stated they were willing to
submit was not good at the time it was written, or at any
time within the time given the appellants to pay the balance of the purchase price or have their contract cancelled. (R 207)
We desire to invite the court's attention to the testimony of Mr. Soelberg (R. 207), a witness called by the
respondents. He testified that he was teller at the Central Branch of the Continental Bank, where the Inland
Development Company account was maintained. (R. 205)
He testified (R. 205) that on August 7, 1951 and August
8, 1951 the balance in that account was $91.99. The
check which appellants offered to give respondents in
payment of the balance of the purchase price was
$5265.03. Mr. Soelberg further testified (R. 207) that if
that check had been presented for payment on Augu'St
7th or August 8th, 1951, it would not have been paid.
Abraham Sieverts testified that he had available
to him money from certain other accounts, but upon crossexamination testified that he did not know (R. 223-4)
how much money was in any of the other accounts. It
would seem to make little difference, however, since no
check on any other account maintained by the Sieverts
under any other business name was offered to the respondents.
In view of the status of the account upon which that

15
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check was drawn, the statement in the Neal case that sufficient funds must be available to pay the check before it
will be considered good tender becomes important.
Respondents also invite the court's attention to the
early Utah case of Hyams v. Bamberger, 36 P. 202. In
this case the question arose as to whether tender in writing pursuant to a statute contained in the Laws of 1888
was sufficient. The pe·rtinent material from that statute
(Sec. 3964), Laws of 1888, is as follows:
"An offer in writing to pay a particular sum
of money* * *is, if not accepted, equivalent to the
actual production and tender of the money."
This is not vastly different from the present statutory provision, 104-54-8, UCA, 1943.
It is extremely significant that the court in the
Hyams case, speaking through Mr. Justice Bartch, says
at page 203 of 36 P :
"A tender in writing under the statute is
'equivalent to the actual production and tender
of money'. To have this effect, however, the party
tendering 'must have the ability to produce it and
must act in good faith."
The respondents submit the· record clearly shows that
at the time there was offered an Inland Development
Company check to the respondents, the appellants did not
have the money and did not act in good faith, and for
that reason their tender was not sufficient, even if it had
not been objected to by the respondents. As a further
indication that the appellants did not have the money
to make payment when they offered to give respondents
a check and as evidence of their lack of good faith, it is
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interesting to note that Loveland, their agent, made out a
check in the sum of $5,000.00 to help "cover" the check
of the appellants.
It is significant that Loveland did not have sufficient funds in the account upon which he drew his check
for $5,000.00 to insure payment. (R. 214, 215, 216, 217)
In cross-examination of Loveland he was asked "Now,
but you knew as of the time you drew that check of yours
that it wasn't any good~" His answer was "No, it was
good." He was further asked: "You didn't have the
money in the bank when you drew the check, did you'"
Answer: "No, but the check wasn't delivered at that time
either."
The record shows that at the time Loveland wrote the
check for $5,000.00 the balance in his account was $721.55. (R. 214) It further appears that on the same day,
August 7, 1951, another check was written by Loveland
to David L. Boshard for $1981.62_, which would have
more than exhausted the account.
After it appeared that Abraham Sie~erts did not
have sufficient money in his account to make good the
check he said he was willing to give to the respondents,
he then testified that he had sufficient money in cash.
(R. 224-5) No cash, however, was ever offered to the
respondents and there is no statement in the record any
place that the appellants made any effort to make payment in cash or to offer to do so. It further developed
(R. 224-5) that the cash money Abraham Sieverts claimed
he had belonged to his father, who was not a party to
this con tract.

17
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From the findings it is clear that the trial court
simply didn't believe that the Sieve~rts had the money to
pay the balance of the purchase price.
POINT NO.3.
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN CANCELLING
THE CONTRACT OR IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANTS
WERE READY, ABLE AND WILLING TO DELIVER A DEED
AND HAD PERFORMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE
TERMS OF THE CONTRACT.

The trial court made a finding that the defendants
were in a position and willing to perform on August 7th
and August 8th, 1951. The following language is found
in Finding No. 14:
"That the defendants had performed in accordance with said Uniform Real Estate Contract,
and on August 7 and August 8, 1951 were ready,
willing and able to execute a proper deed to plaintiffs of all the real property described in said
con tract."
It is the position of the respondents that there is
ample evidence in the record to support this finding and
to show conclusively that the defendants and respondents
were prepared to deliver a good and sufficient deed in accordance with the terms of the contract if they had been
paid the balance of the purchase price.
Point No. 3 in the appellants' brief pre'Sents the
proposition that no cancellation should have been ordered
by the trial court because no tender to the plaintiffs and
appellants of a deed was ever made.
The appellants have conveniently set forth on page
37 of their brief that portion of the contract which is
important in determining what the seller is required to
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do. That portion of the contract reads as follows:
··The seller on receiving the payments herein
reserved to be paid at the time and in the manner
above Inentioned, agrees to execute and deliver
to the buyer or assigns, a good and sufficient warranty deed • * *"
The contract plainly says that the seller must e·xecute and deliver a good and sufficient warranty deed
on receiving the payments. It is not necessary here to
review previous material appearing in this brief which
shows that the payment was never made and no legally
sufficient offer to make payment was ever made.
In support of Point No. 3 in appellants' brief numerous cases are cited, apparently supporting the proposition that payment of money and execution of a deed are
concurrent conditions. Almost without exception these
cases arose as a result of a suit by the vendor for some
relief. In this case the original action was brought by
the vendee.
In connection with the obligation of the seller to excute a deed, we desire to call the court's attention to the
case of Walker v. Hewitt, an Oregon case found at 220
P. 1-!7. In that case action was brought on a note given
for the purchase price of real property and assigned
by the original holder to the plaintiff. The note was not
paid in accordance with its terms and the question arose
as to whether there must be concurrent or simultaneous
exchange of the money and the deed.

A portion of the contract in that case recites "That
if the party of the second part (the defendant) shall first
19
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make payment", then a warranty deed would be executed
and delivered. We should like to note that the language
there is slightly different from the contract in question
here, but we contend the meaning is the same. In the
Walker case the court addresses itself to this problem
in the following language:
"The object of language is not to conceal
ideas, but to express, and where an instrument
provides that one party shall first pay in order
to be entitled to a deed it is logical to conclude,
in the absence of other qualifying language, that
it is intended that the payment must precede the
giving of the deed. The word 'first' does not mean
'coincident with,' or 'at the same moment', either
in law or logic. As the case stands here, the document pleaded by defendant says to defendant, in
effect: 'You must first pay the price evidenced by
the note, and when that is paid plaintiff must make
a deed.' But defendant would have us construe
this language so that the first thing to be done
or tendered is the deed. It would seem that before
defendant can be allowed to urge this defense
to an action on a promissory note he should be required to plead that he had paid or offered to pay,
or is ready and willing to perform his part of a
plain agreement, or show some valid reason why
he should not do so."
In this connection we desire to call the court's attention to the California case of Brant v. Bigler, 208 P. (2d)
47. In that case an action was brought by the plaintiff
vendor for a declaration that defendant vendee was in
default and that a real estate contract should be cancelled.
The question arose as to whether a proper deed had
20
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been tendered and as to the seller's obligation to make
such a tender. The court says at page 49 of 208 P. (2d)
the following:
""In a contract for the sale of real estate the
delivery of the deed and the payment of the purchase price are dependent and concurrent conditions. King Y. Stanley, 32 Cal. 2d 584, 590, 197 P.
2d 321: Cates Y. 11cNeil, 169 Cal. 697, 706, 147 P.
9-!-!; \Yhittier v. Gormley, 3 Cal. App. 489, 86 P.
12G; CiY. Code, Sec. 1657. Neither party to such a
contract can place the other in default unless he
is able to perform or tender performance. Downer
Y. Buehrle, 90 Cal. App. 2d ______ , 203 P. 2d 795;
:JicDonnan v. :Jioody, 50 Cal. App. 2d 136, 122 P.
2d 639; Glock v. Howard & Wilson Colony Co.,
123 Cal. 1, 55 P. 713, -!3 L.R.A. 199, 69 Am. St.
Rep. 17. As stated in 55 Am. Jur. 930: '* * *To
entitle a vendor to d~clare a forfeiture of the contract and retain a deposit or purchase money paid,
there must have been an offer or ability on his
part to perform dependent or concurrent stipulations. * * *' "
In the Brant case it appeared that the seller was
not able to deliver an unencumbered title without using
some purchase money which was in escrow. However, the
important language the court uses is that on the part of
the vendor there must have been an offer or ability to
perform. It is the contention of the respondents that no
question whatever can be raised on the basis of this
record that they could not have executed a good and sufficient warranty deed as called for by the contract.
Further in this connection it should be noted that
since the respondent Lavine White refused to accept a
21
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check in payment, and no cash or cashier's check was
ever delivered or offered, the preparation and physical
delivery to the appellants of a deed would have been unnecessary and useless. The proposition that the law will
not require the doing of a useless act does not require any
extended discussion here.
Even if delivery of the purchase price and the deed
were concurrent conditions of the contract, as contended
for by the appellants, the fact still remains that no proper
tender was ever made by the appellants, and they should
scarcely be able to complain that no deed was ever offered, in view of the ability of the respondents to perform.
We invite the court's attention again to the language
of the contract, which says that the sellers "on receiving
the payments" agree to execute and deliver a deed. We
contend that the plain meaning of that provision of the
contract is that there exists no requirement for the execution and delivery of a deed until the money is paid.
We further contend that the record is unmistakablyclear
that payment was never made.
There is an additional and important consideration
with respect to the obligation of the respondents to execute and deliver a deed. It appears from an examination of the testi1nony that Lavine White, one of the respondents, in a conversation with McKay Loveland, the
appellants' agent, agreed to accept his computation of
the balance due and that he agreed to prepare a deed.
(R. 87) The respondent Lavine White said that upon receiving the money, not a check, she would execute the
deed to be prepared by Loveland or the Sieverts. (R. 87)

22
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A further examination of the transcript shows that
on August 7, 1951 a deed was prepared for the Sieverts.
(R. 102) The examination of Mrs. Christopherson, a
secretary at Inland Realtors, shows that the deed was
prepared. The following question was asked :Mrs. Christopherson on cross-examination :
"Q. You can't recall anything of that kind.
\\T as there any conversation between you and
~[rs. White on that occasion of August 7, 1951,
about the necessity for having Mr. White sign the
deed¥
To that question she made the following answer:
"\Yell, the deed was made out to both-for
"J[r. and "Jirs. White's signature * * *" (R. 102)
In the testimony of Abraham Sieverts (R.108) the
following question was asked by appellants' counsel:
"Q. Was anything said in that conversation
about whether you were to pay in cash, by check,
or how payment was to be made or whether there
was a deed to be prepared f'
~fr.

Sieverts answered as follows:
'·A. That was a discussion. I was on the
other end of the extension. Mr. Loveland discussed that with her, and that's when she said
she didn't have a deed, but then she mentioned
if he would prepare it, that was discussion really
after this discussion, but that's what it ended up
to, that if he would prepare it and take care of it,
why she would come in and get the money."

:Mr. Sieverts was then asked:
"Q. You mentioned something about a deed.
23
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"\Vas anything said as to whether she had prepared
a deed ready to deliver to you 1"
"A. She did not have a deed, and Mr. Loveland said that he would make up a deed."
It would seem clear from the record that the respondent Lavine White agreed to execute a deed, which the
appellants said they would prepare, upon receiving the
amount of money, which she was willing to permit the
appellants to compute. It is also clear that she never
received the money and that the deed prepared by the
appellants was never presented to her or Mr. White for
signature.
In view of the apparent arrangement which existed
on August 7, 1951, that the appellants would have a deed
prepared, it would seem to be comp~etely unconscionable
to permit the appellants now to contend that the respondents should be denied cancellation of the contract because
of their failure to come personally and hand a deed to
the appellants.
The plain fact is that the appellants didn't and
couldn't perform according to the contract. (Ex. C. R. 60,
93, 109, 128, 205, 207, 210, 211, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 223,
224, 225, 228, 229) At the time that the appellants were
obligated to make final payment or suffer cancellation
of their contract, the respondents were ready, willing
and able to perform, and offered to perform if performance was forthcoming on the part of the appellants.

24
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POINT NO.4.
THE DECREE OF THE TRIAL COURT IS AMPLY SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW.

\Vithout unnecessarily amplifying references to the
record, it is the position of the respondents that the findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree of the trial
court are amply supported and justified in every particular.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the reasons set forth in the brief, respondents seriously urge that the decree of the trial
court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

FRED L. FINLINSON
ARTHUR A. ALLEN, JR.,
Attorneys for Defendamts and
Respondents
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Received two copies of the foregoing Brief of Defendants and Respondents this ---------------- day of January,
1953.

Attorneys for Plaintiffs a;nd
Appellants.
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